1. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Facts are models of reality and we represent objects, their relatedness, states of affairs and facts as pictures.

Like the structure of states of affairs, pictures have structure called pictorial form; pictorial form is how the elements of the picture are related to each other.

A picture reaches and becomes overlaid and attached to reality.

Every picture is logical.

A picture is a possible situation in logical space and represents states of affair. The picture may agree or disagree with reality (i.e. be true or false). It is the pictorial form, how well the elements of the picture agree with the objects of states of affairs, that determine whether a picture is true or false.

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4. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

States of affair and therefore facts have structure. The structure is made up of how objects relate to each other.

The world is a totality of existing states of affairs (and therefore objects).

Reality is the determination of the states of affairs which exist and those that do not exist.

3. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Objects determine all situations and make up the substance of the world.

The form of an object determines if it will occur in a particular state of affairs. Therefore, the form of an object determines the substance of the world; but substance does not mean material properties since these are reported by propositions. Propositions are based on objects (they aren’t the objects themselves).

To distinguish between objects, they must have a distinguishing element, even if they have the same logical form.

Substance is the form of objects. Substance must not change (otherwise there would be no world) but the configuration of objects can change.

2. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Facts are the testimony of states of affairs.

Objects (things) combine to create states of affairs.

Once a thing occurs, it occurs within a particular state of affairs; objects are never experienced in isolation. We can always combine an object with another object (e.g. it is always in relation to a viewer).

Objects are limited in that they combine with other objects in states of affairs in a finite number of ways, based on the characteristics of the object. Knowing an object is knowing all ways that the object can possibly combine in a particular state of affairs. If a new possibility is found (and the object is totally known) then a new object has been found.

When all objects are known, all states of affairs are known, all facts in logical space are known and therefore the (logical) world is known.

1. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

We can only say things logically.

What we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.

This implies that when we talk about the world we are not talking about the world as a totality of things, we only talk about the intermediates between us and the world; namely, a totality of logical facts. Things in the world are accessed through the logical construction of language; we must pass over in silence the possibility of Illogical facts or facts about things which do not fit into the logic of our language.

Facts occupy certain positions in logical space. The total configuration of facts in logical space is the world

Nietzsche’s “Genealogy of Morality”

Preface

What is the origin of good and evil? Humans invented the meaning of these words (they weren’t given to us from behind the world). Under what conditions were they invented? What value do they have?

What is the value of morality? Do we overestimate the value of self denial and self sacrifice? Are these not a “no” to life? A nihilism?

1.1 Essay One: “Good” and “Evil”; “Good” and “Bad”

Philosophers have always thought ahistorically; they failed to see that originally unegoistic actions were praised because they were useful to someone. Later the origin was forgotten and unegoistic actions were praised as good in themselves.

“Good” does not stem from those given “goodness” (we are not “good” because God gave us “goodness”). “Good” is self-entitled; the noble, powerful, higher ranked called themselves “good”. “Bad” therefore indicates those not in power. This sets up a pathos of distance in which the “Good” felt vindicated to create and name values. Thus, “Good” is opposed to “Bad”.

Only when the “Good” (powerful) were in decline did egoistic become opposed to unegoistic. The Powerless/“Bad” declared the actions of the Powerful/”Good” as egoistic because such actions were not shared with them. Therefore, the “Bad” (from their point of view) are unegoistic.

The herd instinct (the “Bad” in it together) arises from the opposition with the “Good”.